There never seems to be a dearth in the promotion of those espousing
religious family values, or of those extolling the
positive social benefits of religious practice. These concepts,
however, possess little in the way of true specificity owing to the
wide variance of religious traditions (as well as the numerous
interpretations of each), and are therefore useful mainly as salutary
lubricants to ease the ingestion of what might otherwise be
interpreted as a set of dubious pronouncements: one is supposed to
think something like, “Oh, these are family values with a basis in
religion – I am certainly going to hear some altogether
decent, selfless, and noble advice.” The fact that such disarming
preambles are so prevalent should perhaps induce one to reflect on
the nature of values evinced by the intents and actions of the
world's family of religions: what is to be discovered when
examining the attributes and behaviors of the institutions
themselves?
There are without doubt many striking contrasts between the world's
religious establishments – we might then well wonder whether it is
at all accurate to group them all together as the same “thing.”
When we look at the values they hold in common, I strongly suspect
the reader will agree that, although they are indeed distinct from
one another, they are all of the same kind. Our first
task will be to find the threads that are woven through them all
In addition to the delineations between the major religious
organizations there exist noteworthy variations within any given
establishment. The most common categorization of this phenomenon
follows gradations on a scale spanning the gap between
fundamentalists and liberals. These intra-religious divisions can be
surprisingly deep and bitter, and sometimes lead to permanent schism.
One cannot fail to notice how religious liberals and moderates
(RLMs) take offense when they become lumped together with their more
fundamentalist or extremist brethren. They act as if any perceived
association with such types tarnishes their own credentials and gives
them lower standing then they had heretofore enjoyed; they offer
criticisms of those whom they openly agree are the deserving targets
of society's condemnation. They sometimes act confused or surprised
that they have not been overtly granted exclusion from such criticism
even before any accusations are made, or that they have not been
called in as 'expert' consultants as to the nature of the
fundamentalists' errors. An important part of this undertaking,
therefore, will be to consider whether any substantial difference
exists between liberal, moderate, and fundamentalist sects with
respect to either values or outcomes.
Persuasive arguments have been offered by others to the effect that
religious moderates offer cover to extremists in no small part by
demanding (and receiving) respect for their own variably less
dogmatic views. Once validity is ceded to any single position not
based in reason or evidence then all other kindred positions can
immediately claim elevation to the same unearned status. This can be
observed in the uncomfortable stammering of spokespersons on the left
when they are pressed for explanations on the muted or sideways
response of some RLMs to religiously-based terrorism, especially when
reminded of the existence of clear and unambiguous religious textual
justifications for such acts. These pundits can be heard loudly
decrying extremists yet clearly lack the means for substantive
criticism. They have disarmed themselves by failing to either see or
acknowledge any link between extremists and moderates, either due to
lack of insight or fear of giving offense. They may very well
suspect, or subconsciously realize, that a true and significant
critique of the extremist position will in all probability be just as
legitimate when employed against a moderate stance. Something
similar can be intimated with regard to pundits on the right who are
blind to the obvious parallels between their ideologies (which are,
predictably, based in religious dogma) and those of, for example, the
foul extremists of the middle east.
In any case, the left's efforts to exhort points of cross-traditional
solidarity are just as likely to be counterproductive. The eagerness
with which RLMs of one religion tend to seek out and uphold RLMs of
other faith traditions may serve to further distance the non-RLM
members of those other traditions more so than it may induce positive
feedback in moderates. Members of a particular sect or faith (and in
fact virtually any social group) tend to see that membership as
extending properties of both exclusion and inclusion – the group's
members see outsiders as excluded from participation in their
deliberations, and themselves as bound to one another by inclusion in
the group and its activities. Members in disagreement with each
other over an internal matter typically neither desire nor tolerate
unsolicited opinions from non-members, especially when such opinions
favor one member over another; moreover, the faction with which the
outsider is in disagreement often feels a lasting resentment at the
intrusion. This attribution of exclusive/inclusive membership is
something that all religions, as socially cohesive units, share and
indeed nurture.
Siblings in this family of faiths share many other important
features. If one spends any time pressing a convicted religious
adherent on the ground of his or her beliefs, one will notice that
there is never any evidence offered that is not anecdotal or purely
subjective: personal revelations, visionary or auditory experiences,
intense feelings of being loved or watched over protectively, a
strong conviction that circumstances have conspired towards one's
favor or fortune, a sense of someone listening (and responding) when
one adopts a prayerful attitude, powerful impressions of awe and
wonder, perceptions of a nonphysical yet intimate relationship with a
divine being. Evidence of this sort can be neither validated nor
reproduced, and so cannot really count as evidence in any strict
sense. There is no doubt that these kinds of transcendent
experiences can establish a powerful grip on one's mind, but this
does not speak to the truth or falsity of any particular
interpretation of them, and still leaves in question all derivative
claims. Similarly, the validity of any evidence offered to such
persons counter to their experience or belief is typically either
denied or ignored: recent discoveries in neuroscience and brain
chemistry, the ability to induce identical states of feelings and
perceptions using hallucinogenic substances or targeted electrical
stimulation, emergence of complex systems from simpler ones by the
process of evolution, deterministic causality in physical systems.
Ignoring or denying evidence does not by itself indicate truth or
falsity; however, such averments do not follow logical premises or
accepted methodology for evidential refutation. This implies that
the kind of thinking religious traditions engender results in
individuals who are either unable to understand empirical and logical
proofs or who reflexively shy away from exposure to them. Many
religious traditions overtly state their contempt for reason and
rationality, promoting instead as virtue a noxious smog of
incoherence1.
Those rare few that do in fact claim some basis in reason apply it
to a very limited subset of their systems.
This may be due in no small part to another common and salient
characteristic: the appeal to emotive responses. This plainly
accounts for a heavy preponderance of the allurement of religion
while a far lesser (insignificant?) portion is based in reason.
Affective experiences are by definition intensely personal; however,
when one observes another experiencing the same emotive reaction
given a common stimulus, one may feel close to that other in way that
is impossible to duplicate with any other type of shared experience.
If I observe my future wife shedding tears during a movie by which I
am also profoundly moved, this affords me a connection to her that is
far more compelling and resilient than, say, my lab partner and I
together discovering the solution to a vexing physics problem. Such
affective stimuli can thus become deeply embedded as resonance-points
for shared emotional responses. These types of interpersonal,
affective bonds can endure for great lengths of time, often for life,
because they exist on such a firmly-ingrained level of the self.
Religious traditions have 'learned' (evolved?) strategies on the
exploitation of both the depth and durability of these experiences.
One of these techniques involves the special care taken to utilize
them from the youngest age possible – most often this occurs well
before the full development of reasoning faculties, when the
individual is at the utmost vulnerability to such manipulation. Use
here of the word manipulation is deliberate; the opposite of
this would be persuasion which is indicative of a case based
at least partially in reason, or that at a minimum contains a fair
opportunity for the individual in question to offer refutation or to
reflect on what is presented. There is, however, no successful
religion whatsoever that attempts to compete using only the
persuasive power of its ideas on the basis of reason. Such a
religion would suffer rapid diminution given the lopsided advantage
of emotional indoctrination used by rivals; competing religions have
survived because they utilize similarly powerful means of attracting
and retaining adherents, and as can be seen, the most coercive means
is through an appeal to affective as opposed to cognitive experience,
even more so when applied during a period of minimal or immature
cognitive ability.
Go to Part 2
Go to Part 2
1With
apologies to Dan Dennett and his notion of the “pious fog”
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