A Critique on the Values and Effects of the Family of Religions - Part 1

 There never seems to be a dearth in the promotion of those espousing religious family values, or of those extolling the positive social benefits of religious practice. These concepts, however, possess little in the way of true specificity owing to the wide variance of religious traditions (as well as the numerous interpretations of each), and are therefore useful mainly as salutary lubricants to ease the ingestion of what might otherwise be interpreted as a set of dubious pronouncements: one is supposed to think something like, “Oh, these are family values with a basis in religion – I am certainly going to hear some altogether decent, selfless, and noble advice.” The fact that such disarming preambles are so prevalent should perhaps induce one to reflect on the nature of values evinced by the intents and actions of the world's family of religions: what is to be discovered when examining the attributes and behaviors of the institutions themselves?

There are without doubt many striking contrasts between the world's religious establishments – we might then well wonder whether it is at all accurate to group them all together as the same “thing.” When we look at the values they hold in common, I strongly suspect the reader will agree that, although they are indeed distinct from one another, they are all of the same kind. Our first task will be to find the threads that are woven through them all

In addition to the delineations between the major religious organizations there exist noteworthy variations within any given establishment. The most common categorization of this phenomenon follows gradations on a scale spanning the gap between fundamentalists and liberals. These intra-religious divisions can be surprisingly deep and bitter, and sometimes lead to permanent schism. One cannot fail to notice how religious liberals and moderates (RLMs) take offense when they become lumped together with their more fundamentalist or extremist brethren. They act as if any perceived association with such types tarnishes their own credentials and gives them lower standing then they had heretofore enjoyed; they offer criticisms of those whom they openly agree are the deserving targets of society's condemnation. They sometimes act confused or surprised that they have not been overtly granted exclusion from such criticism even before any accusations are made, or that they have not been called in as 'expert' consultants as to the nature of the fundamentalists' errors. An important part of this undertaking, therefore, will be to consider whether any substantial difference exists between liberal, moderate, and fundamentalist sects with respect to either values or outcomes.

Persuasive arguments have been offered by others to the effect that religious moderates offer cover to extremists in no small part by demanding (and receiving) respect for their own variably less dogmatic views. Once validity is ceded to any single position not based in reason or evidence then all other kindred positions can immediately claim elevation to the same unearned status. This can be observed in the uncomfortable stammering of spokespersons on the left when they are pressed for explanations on the muted or sideways response of some RLMs to religiously-based terrorism, especially when reminded of the existence of clear and unambiguous religious textual justifications for such acts. These pundits can be heard loudly decrying extremists yet clearly lack the means for substantive criticism. They have disarmed themselves by failing to either see or acknowledge any link between extremists and moderates, either due to lack of insight or fear of giving offense. They may very well suspect, or subconsciously realize, that a true and significant critique of the extremist position will in all probability be just as legitimate when employed against a moderate stance. Something similar can be intimated with regard to pundits on the right who are blind to the obvious parallels between their ideologies (which are, predictably, based in religious dogma) and those of, for example, the foul extremists of the middle east.

In any case, the left's efforts to exhort points of cross-traditional solidarity are just as likely to be counterproductive. The eagerness with which RLMs of one religion tend to seek out and uphold RLMs of other faith traditions may serve to further distance the non-RLM members of those other traditions more so than it may induce positive feedback in moderates. Members of a particular sect or faith (and in fact virtually any social group) tend to see that membership as extending properties of both exclusion and inclusion – the group's members see outsiders as excluded from participation in their deliberations, and themselves as bound to one another by inclusion in the group and its activities. Members in disagreement with each other over an internal matter typically neither desire nor tolerate unsolicited opinions from non-members, especially when such opinions favor one member over another; moreover, the faction with which the outsider is in disagreement often feels a lasting resentment at the intrusion. This attribution of exclusive/inclusive membership is something that all religions, as socially cohesive units, share and indeed nurture.

Siblings in this family of faiths share many other important features. If one spends any time pressing a convicted religious adherent on the ground of his or her beliefs, one will notice that there is never any evidence offered that is not anecdotal or purely subjective: personal revelations, visionary or auditory experiences, intense feelings of being loved or watched over protectively, a strong conviction that circumstances have conspired towards one's favor or fortune, a sense of someone listening (and responding) when one adopts a prayerful attitude, powerful impressions of awe and wonder, perceptions of a nonphysical yet intimate relationship with a divine being. Evidence of this sort can be neither validated nor reproduced, and so cannot really count as evidence in any strict sense. There is no doubt that these kinds of transcendent experiences can establish a powerful grip on one's mind, but this does not speak to the truth or falsity of any particular interpretation of them, and still leaves in question all derivative claims. Similarly, the validity of any evidence offered to such persons counter to their experience or belief is typically either denied or ignored: recent discoveries in neuroscience and brain chemistry, the ability to induce identical states of feelings and perceptions using hallucinogenic substances or targeted electrical stimulation, emergence of complex systems from simpler ones by the process of evolution, deterministic causality in physical systems. Ignoring or denying evidence does not by itself indicate truth or falsity; however, such averments do not follow logical premises or accepted methodology for evidential refutation. This implies that the kind of thinking religious traditions engender results in individuals who are either unable to understand empirical and logical proofs or who reflexively shy away from exposure to them. Many religious traditions overtly state their contempt for reason and rationality, promoting instead as virtue a noxious smog of incoherence¹. Those rare few that do in fact claim some basis in reason apply it to a very limited subset of their systems.

This may be due in no small part to another common and salient characteristic: the appeal to emotive responses. This plainly accounts for a heavy preponderance of the allurement of religion while a far lesser (insignificant?) portion is based in reason. Affective experiences are by definition intensely personal; however, when one observes another experiencing the same emotive reaction given a common stimulus, one may feel close to that other in way that is impossible to duplicate with any other type of shared experience. If I observe my future wife shedding tears during a movie by which I am also profoundly moved, this affords me a connection to her that is far more compelling and resilient than, say, my lab partner and I together discovering the solution to a vexing physics problem. Such affective stimuli can thus become deeply embedded as resonance-points for shared emotional responses. These types of interpersonal, affective bonds can endure for great lengths of time, often for life, because they exist on such a firmly-ingrained level of the self. Religious traditions have 'learned' (evolved?) strategies on the exploitation of both the depth and durability of these experiences. One of these techniques involves the special care taken to utilize them from the youngest age possible – most often this occurs well before the full development of reasoning faculties, when the individual is at the utmost vulnerability to such manipulation. Use here of the word manipulation is deliberate; the opposite of this would be persuasion which is indicative of a case based at least partially in reason, or that at a minimum contains a fair opportunity for the individual in question to offer refutation or to reflect on what is presented. There is, however, no successful religion whatsoever that attempts to compete using only the persuasive power of its ideas on the basis of reason. Such a religion would suffer rapid diminution given the lopsided advantage of emotional indoctrination used by rivals; competing religions have survived because they utilize similarly powerful means of attracting and retaining adherents, and as can be seen, the most coercive means is through an appeal to affective as opposed to cognitive experience, even more so when applied during a period of minimal or immature cognitive ability.

Go to Part 2

1With apologies to Dan Dennett and his notion of the “pious fog”