Part 3 is where I put forth what I see as the obvious conclusions developed in Parts 1 and 2.
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the major religions are thoroughly entwined with each other. We cannot uproot the value system of one without causing irreparable damage to the bases of the others; all find fertile soil in the same kinds of minds, seeking and exploiting similar measures of receptivity.
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the major religions are thoroughly entwined with each other. We cannot uproot the value system of one without causing irreparable damage to the bases of the others; all find fertile soil in the same kinds of minds, seeking and exploiting similar measures of receptivity.
And what are we to make of the exposition of their values? Love of
truth immediately comes to mind as it is incessantly espoused
as a religious value of utmost primacy, but such truths are simply
declared using certainty by fiat with a dismissive air
towards anyone desirous of independent verification or even
discursive explanation. This type of self-assured and absolute claim
is in fact the most fatal form of relativism – under such a scheme
there is no mode whereby one can acknowledge the possibility of
validity for any other position (thus, discussion and debate are
nonexistent); all external perspectives are kept forever out of
reach. It is a relativist outlook that is arrogantly dismissive of
its own relativism.
The notion of free will is central to the value system of religions,
for in its absence every decision, action, reward, and punishment is
clearly void; yet, we have seen that religious systems thwart the
very will of reason by circumnavigating rational thought and
appealing directly to baser affective experiences. If we understand
that our emotions are personal reactions as opposed to
considered decisions this point stands out with alarming
clarity. Too, those faiths that are rigid in their doctrine of god's
omnipotence (such as Islam) contradict themselves in regard to free
will without even realizing it, since the idea of an omnipotent deity
belies the existence of a will to begin with. The deeper meaning
behind the constant refrain of “God willing” (and all of its
varied cognates) reduces us to puppets dancing on strings
unperceived; such utterances are completely antithetical to the idea
of a deity having mercy or kindness. We can imagine that laboratory
mice we put in a maze, some of whom we observe finding the cheese and
others of whom we observe dying of starvation in a fruitless search,
might exhort the following during their struggles: I will surely
find the cheese, Scientist willing. Such a statement reduces
individuals to objects, strips their connections with one another of
meaning or content, and relegates any relationship with the deity to
that of simple material possession.
The value of self-worth takes on an obviously distorted meaning in
religious thought. Self-worth, and in many cases even the sense
of self, is tied to something that is always, given a
sufficiently long conversation, reduced to ineffability, which makes
such concepts themselves ineffable. To remove such fundamental
attributes of humanity from the realm of understanding is to diminish
humanity itself. The assertion that (according to all major
religions) self-improvement is meaningless without the assistance or
approval of a god serves to further erode human dignity.
Every successful faith puts significant effort into profiting by and
expanding upon existing social conventions that are beneficial
(wherever possible), and into coercing unfriendlier systems to its
favor or eliminating them. Rather than shaping or improving social
systems to enhance humanity's overall well-being and disposition,
religious institutions apply these enormous pressures upon the fabric
of society merely to ensure the longevity and growth of the
institutions themselves. As such, altruism is notably absent from
the repertoire of these organizations; it has been totally displaced
by institutional solipsism.
This collection of values and shared attributes, along with the
various forms in which they are expressed, does not paint a
flattering picture of what many consider to be our finest and most
respectable institutions. This is not surprising as religious
systems are so made that they exercise (at best) minimal
self-reflection, an indispensable tool for moral progress. It is
apparent that the values which religious institutions seem to demand
of their followers are ignored by the institutions themselves.
Now let us turn to the secondary consideration regarding whether Religious Liberals and Moderates (RLMs) are substantially different from their extremist brethren. To
advance a negation of this commonly-held supposition it may suffice
merely to consider the same topics just visited, since RLMs differ
little or not at all with regard to the preceding arguments. There
is no evidence offered by RLMs that is not of the same variety as
that offered by extremists, which is neither falsifiable nor
reproducible. The appeal to the emotional, non-rational side of
personality is utilized as much by RLMs as by the extremists,
although it may be true that RLMs tend to emphasize attractive,
positive emotional connections over those that provoke shame and
guilt. If there is any real danger of cultural or moral relativism,
it follows as well from the half-hearted efforts of the RLMs who
apparently wish to avoid offending anyone and so contribute nothing
substantively new or novel to the discussion on what ought to
comprise a common moral framework. RLMs fail to disavow themselves
of the notion that humans are hopelessly and fundamentally flawed
with no capacity for self-correction, and most of those of whom I am
aware also subscribe to the doctrine of redemption only through
submission. Finally, since they remain attached to the same faiths
from whence are spawned extremists they too inherit from earlier
religions and have descendant (or otherwise closely-related) textual
bases. They are in all of these respects indistinguishable from the
extremists.
When we meet with RLMs, however, we find them amicable and
accommodating; they seem genuinely willing to listen to and
interested in the other side's arguments. They appear
non-confrontational and non-judgmental. How could one believe for a
second that they are in any way close to the loathsome extremists
when they come across as the exact opposite?
A more revealing test of similarity would be to observe conversations
between RLMs and extremists of the same faith surrounding a
disagreement among themselves. Whenever this happens two things
become plain: 1) the RLM side has no standing to offer legitimate or
even convincing criticism to the extremists, because 2) it relies on
the exact same modes of argumentation based on subjective evidence,
appeals to emotion, countering of one scriptural quote with another
scriptural quote, etc. RLMs cannot step outside of the universe of
religious discourse in which they coexist with the extremists, but
can only argue from inside it, and, of course, all of the arguments
offered from within that system are dependent upon it. This
circularity precludes any concrete ability to induce their
antagonists to change.
If positive headway is ever made in such an exchange, it is because
one antagonist frees herself from the limitations of a self-dependent
position, and is thereby able to make a point capable of broaching
the closed loop. In this case she is in fact arguing from a rational
perspective. The extent to which an RLM relies upon religious
thought and dogma in a dispute with an extremist is inversely
proportional to that RLM's ability to form a cogent counter-point or
persuade that extremist.
It seems as if RLMs and extremists, then, differ not in kind,
rather merely by degree. The true gap between them is slight
or nonexistent, and is more a matter of perception than substance.
That RLMs are more palatable and polite adversaries is, sadly, no
indication of a greater 'reasonableness' in their position versus
that of the extremists'. They can offer no meaningful assistance in
countering ridiculous claims made by extremists or in undercutting an
extremist position. Every defense they offer for their own position
similarly defends the extremist position; they can make no point for
which the extremist cannot frame an effective counterpoint. We
appreciate their solidarity with us but they lend scant material
support.
It is true that in each of the major religions there exist
RLM-leaning sects that have moved much of the focus away from one's
inherent unworthiness (and thus absolute dependence on deity's mercy)
and towards the positive aspects of humanity: forgiveness, kindness,
and the like. I have attended a number of such churches myself,
however, and have always found that there remains an omnipresent
flirtation with the darker aspects of religious conditioning
discussed above; I have also made the unpleasant discovery that these
aspects sometimes surface in an alarming fashion during unscripted or
informal discussions and testimonials. I believe that for them the
power of such mechanisms is too critical to abandon altogether,
because in their complete absence what these churches would preach is
nearly indistinguishable from humanism; retention of these aspects
gives them the only tangible connection they have to the status
(whether interpreted as pejorative or complimentary) of a religion.
I hope it is plain to see at this point that a significant portion of
the distinct features and values possessed and invoked by those
entities understood to be religions are either counter to their own
professed aims, an outright affront to genuine social progress, or
quite simply odious. While we all know that we can glean some kernel
of wisdom even from the bad example of a villain in a poorly written
novel, we do not seek advice from such characters nor do we look for
direct moral clarity in their actions or utterances. The case is the
same whether with historic, traditional, modern or even moderate
members of the family of religions, who provide an abundance of
opportunities for illuminating ill-informed behaviors. Why, then, do
we accede so much of our moral authority to such patently bad actors?
Aren't we shirking the obligation we have to ourselves and our
children that impels us to leave the world a better place than we
found it? In what way does allowing these types of institutions
carte blanche in our society foster human compassion?
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